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Are shareholder derivative suits at death's door?
Once
described as "the most important procedure the law has yet developed
to police the internal affairs of corporations,"' derivative suits are
today regularly portrayed as nuisance suits whose "principal
beneficiaries ... are attorneys." 2 Even if these critics are wrong, there
may now be less need for derivative suits, as other forms of
representative suits have grown up that do much of their work.
Federal securities fraud class actions increasingly address legal claims
that raise issues about management care, 3 and fiduciary duty class
actions under state law are the principal litigation vehicle to remedy
management misconduct in merger and acquisition settings. 4 At the
same time, American stock exchanges now require more independent
directors for larger public companies, a change that will make it more
difficult for derivative suits to survive procedural challenges under
existing legal rules. 5
1.
Eugene Rostow, To Whom and For What End is Corporate Management Responsible? in
THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 48 (E. Mason ed., 1959). See Reinier Kraakman et al.,
When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1733 (1994)
("Shareholder suits are the primary mechanism for enforcing the fiduciary duties of corporate
managers.").
2.
Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?,7 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 55, 65 (1991); Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 351, 351 (2001) (asserting that "suits are filed because [shareholders] attorneys stand to
reap substantial fees"); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 402 (2002)
("In almost all cases, the legal fees of plaintiffs exceed the monetary payment to shareholders.");
Id. at 404 ("A radical solution would be the elimination of derivative suits....
Derivative
litigation appears to have little, if any, beneficial accountability effects. On the other side of the
equation, [it] is a high cost constraint and infringement upon the board's authority.").
3.
Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections upon Federalism,56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860-61 (2003).
4.
Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation:
Acquisition-OrientedClass Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 168 (2004).
5.
Increased board independence has two effects that need to be considered here. The first
is that the demand futility will be harder to establish in conflict of interest cases if there are
more independent directors on the board. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 810 (Del. 1984)
(demand is not futile unless the plaintiff can allege facts creating a reasonable doubt that either
a majority of the board of directors is interested in the challenged transaction, or that the
transaction is not the product of a valid exercise of business judgment). This likely will lead to
more dismissals of derivative actions for failure to make demand. On the other hand, more
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Despite all this adversity, we believe derivative suits continue
to play an important role. In fact, we see them having the legal
equivalent of a cat's nine lives. 6 They have survived vigorous reform
movements in both the 1940s 7 and the early 1980s. 8 Public company
suits continue to be filed and to make new law. The impact of
decisions in derivative cases like Caremark,9 Disney,10 and Oracle"
goes well beyond the outcome of the cases themselves. These decisions
changed the rules for future legal practice by allowing well-motivated
legal counselors to get their clients to accept better conduct and
procedures. Moreover, derivative suits against private companies
perform an important, if less heralded, role in policing conflict of
interest transactions and duty of care violations.
To support our claim, we present the data from a study of all
corporate litigation in Delaware for a two year period. We find that
there are a small number of derivative suits, about thirty per year,
brought against public companies incorporated in Delaware. Contrary
to earlier studies, we do not find evidence that that these cases are
"strike suits" yielding little benefit. Instead, roughly 30 percent of the
derivative suits provide relief to the corporation or the shareholders,
while the others are usually dismissed quickly with little apparent
independent boards may help companies avoid self-dealing in the first instance. This latter
effect would benefit shareholders by reducing potential duty of loyalty violations.
6.
Like the proverbial cat, derivative suits have been pronounced dead on numerous
occasions, only to rise from the dead with renewed vigor. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E.
Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative
Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 261 (1981) ("The shareholder derivative suit today faces
extinction.. . . Thirty-odd years ago, commentators foresaw the derivative suit's demise when
state legislatures began adopting security-for-expenses statutes ....");James D. Cox, Searching
for the Corporation'sVoice in Derivative Suit Litigation:A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project,
1982 DUKE L. J. 959, 959-60 (1982) ("Like the heroine in a Saturday matinee, the derivative suit
has repeatedly appeared to be at the cliffs of disaster. The adoption of security for expense
statutes, the enactment of broadly permissive indemnification statutes, and even the judicial
tightening of pleading requirements against derivative suit defendants have each been
proclaimed in turn as the death knell of the derivative suit .... [The] latest threat to the
derivative suit is the special litigation committee ....
").
7.
See generally, FRANKLIN S. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS'
DERIVATIVE SUITS (1944) (reporting that derivative suits in the 1930s and early 1940s were
largely frivolous).
8.
See generally George W. Dent, Jr., The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder
Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 96 (1980).
9.
Caremark Int'l. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (finding in dicta
that boards had a duty to consider whether to create internal monitoring systems).
10. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 287-89 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(denying motion to dismiss complaint alleging that board had breached the duty of good faith in
determining executive compensation package).
11. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 942-43 (Del. Ch. 2003) (finding that
tenured professors who were members of special litigation committee were not independent
where financial ties between university and corporation were substantial).
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litigation activity. In cases producing a recovery to shareholders, the
amount of recovery typically exceedS the amount of attorneys' fees
awarded by a significant margin. The cases do demonstrate some
indicia of litigation agency costs (for example, suits being filed quickly,
multiple suits per controversy, and repeat plaintiffs' law firms), but
each of these costs is much less pronounced for derivative suits than
for other forms of representative litigation. Overall, the claim that
derivative suits are typically strike suits is much weaker than in
earlier periods.
When we examine our data on private company litigation, we
find an even smaller number of cases, about a dozen per year, usually
involving a dispute among a small group of shareholders. These cases
almost always involve claims by a minority shareholder against a
controlling shareholder group. They raise none of the problems of
representative litigation that can arise in public companies. Evidence
of large benefits to shareholders is less visible, but the small number
of cases and the focus of the dispute within a very small set of
investors also reduce the litigation agency costs.
This Article proceeds as follows. First, we describe the nature
of derivative suits and where they fit among the various constraints
on management behavior that exist today. We also place their legal
regulation in a historical context. Second, we present our empirical
study of derivative suits in Delaware, including data that confounds
some of the accepted wisdom in the academic literature about their
value. Third, we outline a possible role for derivative suits for the
future. Few would contest that derivative suits have an important
role in the governance of private companies. Even regarding public
corporations, we believe that policymakers have swung too far toward
discouraging derivative suits. In contrast to earlier times, strong
procedural limits in existence today have kept litigation agency costs
low in modern derivative suits. The Delaware judiciary, which hears
most public company corporate litigation in America, has effectively
monitored these cases. There is room to open the door for larger
shareholders to utilize these suits to police corporate misconduct.
Institutional shareholders, while not willing to take on as large a role
in governance as many have suggested in terms of naming directors
and the like, may be willing to take a larger role in derivative
litigation. Thus, we see potential for derivative litigation to play a
more important role in the future. We therefore suggest that suits
brought by a 1 percent or larger shareholder should be excused from
the demand requirement that is currently applied in derivative suits.
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DERIVATIVE SUITS' ROLE AS A CONSTRAINT ON MANAGEMENT
MISCONDUCT

The picture of corporate governance presented in American
corporations statutes is focused on the board of directors and centered
on law as the most visible constraint on the board's broad power. This
view of board-centric, law-centric governance is anachronistic. Law is
part of a rich array of constraints that also includes markets, private
ordering, and norms. Directors share their governance functions with
officers, shareholders, and various gatekeepers such as auditors,
analysts, and attorneys. In this section, we begin by outlining the
traditional view of corporate governance. We then discuss the specific
role that shareholder litigation has played in such a system. In each
subsection, we explain why the traditional picture no longer
accurately describes corporate governance.
A. The TraditionalStatutory Template of Governance
State corporation laws create corporations and establish the
skeleton of the structure by which they are governed. These statutes
start from the foundational premise that all corporate power
ultimately resides in the board. 12 State corporations statutes identify
two additional groups-shareholders and officers-and specify their
role in governance, but their role comes nowhere close to that
13
prescribed for directors.
Shareholders by statute are permitted to do two things in very
limited doses: voting and suing. 14 They also have a third action that
they can take: selling their shares as permitted under the general
rules of property law that provide the foundation on which the

12. For example, Section 8.01 of the Model Business Corporation Act contains such a bold
declaration, and Section 141 of the Delaware General Corporation Law expresses a similar rule
See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) ("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the
authority of ... its board of directors."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 ("The business and affairs of
every corporation ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors .... ).
13. In the Model Act, Chapter 7 defines the role for shareholders and Subchapter 8D
addresses officers. In Delaware the shareholder role is covered in Section 211 et seq., and the
role of officers is defined in § 142.
14. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ch. 7B (addressing shareholder voting) and ch. 7D
(specifying procedures for derivative proceedings). In Delaware, shareholder litigation rights are
mostly a product of case law.
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corporations codes rest.15
Courts cite voting as providing the
necessary legitimacy for the directors' broad control over other
people's money, but shareholder voting is, in reality, a remarkably
limited power. 16 First, shareholder voting is nothing like direct
democracy, as shareholders only get to vote on a few "fundamental"
corporate changes and then only after the directors have decided they
are willing to bring those matters to a vote. 17 Directors control the
agenda containing the matters on which shareholders get to vote.18
Shareholders get to elect directors annually, but management almost
always selects the nominees. 19 Even then, most public corporations
have staggered boards, like the United States Senate, with one third
of the members elected each year, so that if shareholders united to
throw the incumbents out, it likely would take two annual meetings to
do S0.20
Officers, the only other governance participant identified in
state corporations statutes, are, in fact, barely mentioned in those
provisions. Indeed, Delaware's statute is almost completely silent as
to officers. 2 1 It mentions them with directors in terms of authorizing
loans and indemnification, but otherwise leaves their identity,
qualifications, method of selection, and removal entirely to board
resolutions and the company's bylaws. 22 Other stakeholder groups,

15. State law is mostly silent on shareholder rights in a tender offer. The federal
government has filled some of that gap by the Williams Act, which specified some rules for how
tender offers are conducted. See infra note 29.
16. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (1988) (shareholder voting is
"critical to the theory that legitimates the exercise of power ... by some over vast aggregations of
property that they do not own.").
17. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 11.04. Shareholders vote on a merger only after
directors have proposed the transaction for approval; if directors oppose a merger, shareholders
do not get to vote. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152-53 (Del.
1990).
18. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 591-95
(1990).
19. The current proposal of the Securities and Exchange Commission to provide
shareholders with some direct access to the ballot is the latest effort to address this. See
Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48626.htm.
20. Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory,
Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 887 (2002).
21. The Model Business Corporation Act, the basis for corporations law in more than half of
the states, goes further than Delaware and includes a section setting standards for the conduct of
officers. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.42.
22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142 (a)-(b). A rare specific officer rule found in this section is to
provide that officers may resign at any time. Id. § 142 (b). Agency law overlays the statutory
framework to flesh out the role of officers in the corporation. Thus, we know that officers are
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such as employees, creditors, suppliers, the public, or others whom the
corporation's business may impact, have no governance role under the
23
corporations statutes.
Even the governance role for directors is remarkably sketchy.
24
While American stock exchanges now require independent directors,
the Delaware statute contains no such requirement. 25 Delaware is
distinctive in the extent of its willingness to trust directors to use
their broad power as they see fit, subject to occasional judicial
constraint via application of fiduciary duties.
For much of its history of involvement in corporate governance,
federal law has superficially recognized the power of the states to
define the structure of corporate governance. In the wake of the Great
Depression and the economic dislocation of that period, the federal
government eschewed a federal incorporation statute that would have
replaced the state law governance structure. Instead, Congress chose
to focus on specific aspects of governance, particularly practices that
were aimed to facilitate shareholder use of their voting power as
might exist under state law. More specifically, the federal securities
laws mandated that extensive information must be provided to
shareholders prior to their giving a proxy to vote for directors,
mergers, or charter amendments. Federal rules also regulate both the
process by which proxies are solicited and the contents of a proxy
statement that is sent out to security holders. 26 Beginning in the
1940s, the SEC interpreted Section 14 of the 1934 Exchange Act to
authorize shareholder access to a company's proxy statement. 27 The

clearly subordinate to directors, as they are agents of the corporation charged with those duties
as may be defined by the board.
23. Other countries have taken a different approach toward stakeholders' role in the
corporation. Employees, for example, are a key part of corporate statutes in countries such as
Germany where there is a supervisory board on which labor has half of the seats. MARK J. ROE,
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT
71-72 (2003).

24. See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange, Listed Company Manual § 303A.01, available at
http://www.nyse.com/listed/1022221393251.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
25. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142 requires only that directors be natural persons and
authorizes the certificate or bylaws to provide other qualifications. Case law uses independence
in defining the degree to which directors can act for the corporation and the degree to which the
courts will defer to the actions of directors. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del.
1984).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78(n); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 et seq.
27. RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANOW & EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL §16.01[A], at 16-6 (3d ed. 1998) (also discussing the evolution of the

shareholder proposal rule).

1754

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:5:1747

SEC's recent proposal to expand shareholder access to nominations
28
would further extend the reach of the federal regulations.
When the evolution of markets enhanced the possibility of
shareholder selling as a viable takeover strategy, the Williams Act
and related SEC rulemaking sought to protect shareholders in their
decisions about whether to sell in response to a tender offer. 29 The
effect of these new rules was to provide shareholders with more time
and information about takeover bids for their company. Yet federal
involvement stopped short of overriding defensive tactics such as
30
poison pills authorized by state law that block a shareholder vote.
The recent trend in federal regulation has been to increase its
focus on officers and their obligations. During the run-up to the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan observed that the chief executive officer (CEO) is the
fulcrum of corporate governance today. 3 1 Given the importance of
officers to good corporate governance, Sarbanes-Oxley regulates
officers more than state law has ever done. Sarbanes-Oxley requires
33
32
the CEO to certify company disclosures, bans loans to insiders,
requires
disgorgement
of officer
bonuses
after
financial
34
restatements, and makes it easier for the SEC to ban individuals
35
from serving as officers or directors of public companies.
In the wake of Enron, new regulation on directors has come
mostly from the stock exchanges. The New York Stock Exchange and
NASDAQ, prodded by the SEC and after lengthy review by the
agency, now require their listed companies to have a majority of
independent directors and three board committees composed entirely
28. See Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/3448626.htm.
29. 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967) (statement of Senator Williams) ("[T]he need for such
legislation has been caused by the increased use of cash tender offers rather than the regular
proxy fight to gain control of publicly-owned corporations ... [t]his legislation will close a
significant gap in investor protection under the federal securities laws .... ")
30. Instead these are judged under state law fiduciary duty concepts with Delaware courts
applying an enhanced scrutiny. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-955
(Del. 1985).
31. Alan Greenspan, Excerpts from Remarks to the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at C8
(explaining that "vast and highly leveraged financial markets and institutional shareholders who
sell has placed de facto control in the hands of the CEO.").
32.
Sarbanes-Oxley § 401, 15 U.S.C. § 7241; this followed SEC action pursuant to its
investigatory powers that required top officers of almost one thousand companies to certify their
financial results.
33. Sarbanes-Oxley § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k).
34. Sarbanes-Oxley § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243.
35. Sarbanes-Oxley § 1105, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3.
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of independent directors.3 6 Directors are required to meet without the
chief executive officer, and directors have specific duties regarding
37
audit and compliance.
This director-centric legal system is only a portion of the
corporate governance matrix. In addition to law, it is also necessary to
model markets, private ordering, and norms as regulators of corporate
behavior. The market for executive services dramatically influences
governance, and the takeovers market has become a key component of
governance in addition to the product market and the capital
market.3 8 Private ordering is a crucial part of corporate governance,
providing a rich array of incentives and monitoring. Contracts such as
pay for performance compensation agreements have become a
recurring part of governance. 39 Private ordering has also provided a
variety of monitoring mechanisms including auditors, analysts, and
attorneys. 40 In fact, the board itself is a monitoring mechanism,
revealing the hazy line separating legal controls and market or
private ordering. Disclosure, a legal requirement of the federal
securities laws, facilitates monitoring and incentives generated by
41
private ordering.
In private companies, private ordering is king. There is no
separation of ownership and control in most of these firms, as most
investors are also employees. Investors often protect themselves
through contractual mechanisms, such as buy-sell and shareholder
agreements. The federal and state regulatory authorities have been

36. NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to Corporate Governance, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-48745 (proposed Nov. 4, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/3448745.htm.
37. See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange, Listed Company Manual § 303A.01-13, available at
http://www.nyse.com/listed/1022221393251.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2004); NASDAQ, Rule
4350(c), available at http://cchwallstreet.com/nasd/nasd.asp?print=l&printnode=4.22&Selected
Node=4&FileName=%2Fnasd%2Fnasd%5Frules%2FRulesoftheAssociation%5Fmg%2Exml#chp_
1_4 18_ab (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
38. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV & Reinier Kraakman, CEO Incentives and Merger Activity
in the 1990s: Stock Options and Real Options (Working Paper Nov. 3, 2003) (CEO pay structure
can affect takeover incidence at individual companies).
39. Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2519
(1999).
40. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's All About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid," 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1405 (2002) (detailing professionals' roles as reputational
intermediaries who provide verification and certification services).
41. Delaware law does require disclosure in various fiduciary settings, but its courts have
acknowledged the expertise of the federal government in this area. See former Chancellor
Allen's comments that disclosure is left to federal law where there is more expertise, "An
administrative agency-the Securities and Exchange Commission-has a technical staff, is able
to hold public hearings, and can, thus, receive wide and expert input, and can specify forms of
disclosure, if appropriate." Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 332-33 (Del. Ch. 1997).
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willing to let privately held firms operate outside of the disclosure
regime, and these firms do not have publicly traded securities, so that
market discipline is usually lacking.
B. The Role of Derivative Suits in a ChangingMenu of Governance
For most of the twentieth century, the dominant paradigm of
corporate governance within legal academia was that provided by
Berle and Means in their classic 1932 book. 42 They presented large
American corporations as management-dominated with shareholders
having little power to control management's actions. The market for
corporate control was hardly visible in that period. Shareholder
voting widely was seen as ineffective even after federal securities law
efforts to mandate disclosure that would improve shareholder
43
participation.
Derivative suits were the earliest and principal constraint on
director mismanagement. 44
A typical statement is that of the
Supreme Court in 1949 in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.
where the Court observed that the derivative suit was "long the chief
regulator of corporate management." 45 Growth in derivative suits
46
continued into the second half of the twentieth century.
By the first decade of the twenty-first century it is fair to say
that the role of derivative suits has receded from such a lofty position.
An account of this decline reflects several dramatic changes from the
environment described by Berle and Means. The development of the
market for corporate control, particularly in the early 1980s, provided
a real alternative to litigation as a method of constraining managers.
In addition, private ordering took on a much larger role with the

42. ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER
PROPERTY (1932).

C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE

43. Thomas & Dixon, supra note 27, at § 1.01[A], at 1-5, 1-6 (quoting Thomas Corcoran's
testimony before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce).
44. Derivative suits have been "a recognized form of litigation in American courts since
1855." Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 261 (citing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856) as marking its acceptance of the derivative suit).
Professor Deborah DeMott has traced the early history that derivative suits served outside of
corporate governance as a vehicle to provide for litigation of constitutional issues. See DEBORAH
A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION § 1.3 (2002). Derivative suits continue to perform a
variety of functions in equity courts such as permitting a beneficiary of a trust to sue for harm
done to the trust. But in recent times, the academic focus on derivative suits has narrowed to
their role in corporate governance.
45. 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) ("It is argued, and not without reason, that without it there
would be little practical check on such abuses.").
46. Daniel Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 74 (1967)
(describing extensive growth in derivative suits in the 1960s).
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advent of incentive-based compensation and CEO employment
contracts, among other things.
Since the time of Berle and Means, the board has gradually
become more of a monitoring body made up mostly of outside
directors. 47 At the same time, in most large American companies,
ownership has shifted away from dispersed individual shareholders
toward large institutional investors. 48 Law, private ordering, and
norms all have strengthened the roles of various gatekeepers who
affect corporate governance, particularly auditors, but also attorneys
and analysts. All of these changes have necessarily decreased the
roles of law and litigation. In this sense, law is humble; it does not
take on a role for itself that can be more effectively done by markets or
49
private ordering.
Even in the part of the spectrum in which law and litigation
retain relative advantage as regulators of corporate governance,
derivative suits have had to share this function with younger cousins.
Changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the 1960s
permitted the growth of widespread class actions based on securities
fraud. 50 These lawsuits, ostensibly based on incomplete or inadequate
disclosure, increasingly address management decisions in running the
corporation. Moreover, in recent years, the number of class actions
brought in state court alleging violations of director fiduciary duties
under state law has become very large. 51 These class action suits arise
mostly in an acquisition context and now greatly exceed the number of
52
derivative claims brought against public companies in Delaware.
Finally, a relatively small but important number of cases are filed
seeking judicial determinations concerning other corporate problems,

47.

See e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS

AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3A.01(a) (1994) (recommending that large public corporations should
have a majority of outside directors).
48. THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 27, at §1.01[C], at 1-13, 1-14 (by 1990 institutional
investors owned more than 50 percent of all outstanding equity securities of American
corporations).
49. See Ronald Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations:The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 839 (1981) ("Where incentive mechanisms created
by one part of the corporate structure - the various markets in which the corporation and its
managers function - constrain managerial discretion to perform inefficiently, one would not
expect a different part of that structure to provide redundant controls. As we have seen, the legal
elements of corporate structure are consistent with this conclusion.").
50. But this was not the original purpose of the class action provisions. See 3B JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
23.02-6 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that Rule 23 was
enacted for the "specific purpose" of ensuring class actions would be available to enforce civil
rights statutes).
51. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 167 tbl. 2.
52. Id.
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such as appraisal actions, direct suits, books and records access,
53
corporate dissolutions, and annual meetings.
At the same time that these alternatives to derivative suits
have been growing, both in the form of other kinds of litigation and
with the development of market and private ordering described above,
derivative suits have been increasingly limited by a variety of
procedural and substantive restrictions imposed to prevent perceived
abuses generated by such suits. 54 A derivative suit is brought in the
name of the collective entity, the corporation, by an individual
shareholder asserting the right to speak for the corporation. 55 Any
recovery usually goes to the corporation. This means that the return
to an individual shareholder via a pro rata increase in the value of the
shares owned by the shareholder (recognized only if the shareholder
sells the shares) is dwarfed by the immediate expense of bringing the
suit.5 6 Law firms are the economic actors most likely to be willing to
bear the expense of such suits, but the result is the creation of
litigation agency costs, to the extent that these individual plaintiffs
57
and their attorneys have different interests than the shareholders.
These differing incentives of the nominal plaintiff and the attorneys
have created the possibility of strike suits or, as they are sometimes
called, nuisance suits.
A 1940 study by Franklin Wood gave great attention to this
story of abuse and led to new restrictions on derivative suits, such as
the requirement for a bond to be posted by the plaintiff.5 8 More
recently, the procedural focus has centered on the requirement that
the shareholder make a demand on directors prior to bringing the suit,
which effectively gives directors the opportunity to dismiss the suit as
53. See id. at 169-171 (documenting the number and type of actions filed in the Delaware
Chancery Court from 1999 through 2000).
54. One threshold question that plaintiffs must often litigate is whether their claim is a
derivative or direct claim. As the Delaware Supreme Court has recently noted, the law in this
area has "not [been] helpful to a proper analytical distinction between direct and derivative
actions." Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1035 (Del. 2004). As a
result, that court overruled its earlier decisions and restated the distinction as follows: "The
analysis must be based solely on the following questions: Who suffered the alleged harm--the
corporation or the suing shareholder individually-and who would receive the benefit of the
recovery or other remedy?" Id.
55.

JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX AND HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS §15.02 (2d ed.

2003).
56. In a limited set of circumstances, the individual shareholder can seek an individual
recovery. Id. § 15.04 (giving as an example a situation in which, if wrongdoers are still in control
of corporation and there is no fear that creditors will be harmed, then individual recovery may be
awarded).
57. We explore this in more detail in Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 14-18.
58. See WOOD, supra note 7. We discuss the Wood report at length in our earlier paper,
Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 14-15.
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not in the best interests of the corporation.5 9 As a practical matter,
plaintiffs never make such a demand on the board, but rather plead
that a demand would be futile. To establish demand futility in
Delaware, for instance, plaintiffs must plead facts that create a
reasonable doubt that a majority of the board is capable of
independently determining whether to pursue the litigation. 60 The
main difficulty is that the plaintiffs cannot use discovery to learn
information that they need to formulate such allegations.6 1 Empirical
research has shown that defendants frequently succeed in challenging
62
the plaintiffs' claim that the demand would be futile.
Even if a suit survives the demand hurdle, the board of
directors can still form a special independent litigation committee that
can dismiss the case. 63 The academic presentation of derivative suits,
for the most part, reflects the hostility of the Wood report, both (1) in
its conclusion that derivative suits are an ineffective instrument of

59. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP ACT ch. 7D (requiring written demand with notice be made
upon directors before a shareholder brings a derivative suit).
60. Aronson v. Lewis 473 A.2d 805, 810 (Del. 1984) (finding demand only excused if
reasonable doubt is created as to directors' disinterestedness or their independence or that the
challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of the board's business
judgment). On the crucial question of director independence, the Delaware Supreme Court's
recent decision in Beam v. Martha Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (2004) has clarified the
standard under Delaware law. There the court held that mere friendships or outside business
relationships between the director and alleged wrongdoer are not sufficient by themselves to
disqualify the director from being independent in determining demand futility. Id.
61. The Delaware courts claimed to have opened the door to derivative actions by
repeatedly admonishing plaintiffs to use the Delaware books and records statute to gain access
to internal corporate documents before filing a derivative complaint. See, e.g., Rales v. Blasband,
634 A.2d 927, 934 n.10 (Del. 1993). While occasionally a well-funded plaintiff does file such a
case, and thereby improves its pleading substantially (see, e.g., In re Walt Disney Shareholders
Litigation, 825 A.2d 275, 279 (2003)), the fact remains that after ten years of judicial prodding,
the idea has not sparked much interest. In short, based on its use to present, it seems unlikely
that using the books and records statute is going to have much effect on the way the Delaware
courts do business. See Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate
Management by Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 331, 360 (1996)
("Many plaintiffs will be reluctant to rely on such an uncertain, lengthy, and costly procedure to
learn if they should bring an action for corporate wrongdoing.").
62. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An
Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U.L.Q. 569, 576-80 (2001) (For cases challenging executive
compensation in Delaware after Aronson v. Lewis, motions to dismiss for failure to make demand
are made in 75 percent of the sample cases and the defendants succeed in about 61 percent of
these motions. By contrast, in all other jurisdictions over the same time period, such motions are
only made about 25 percent of the cases and are successful only about 57 percent of the time).
63. However, the members of the special committee must be truly independent in order for
the court to give any deference to its recommendation that a derivative action be dismissed. In
re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 942-43 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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corporate governance, 64 and (2) in its assertion that derivative
65
litigation generates high agency costs.
The academy has virtually ignored derivative suits against
private companies. Yet in many states, such suits retain an important
role in policing management in closely held corporations. Unlike
public corporations, there is neither an established market for a
private company's stock nor similar constraints on manager's misuse
of the centralized power that is given to directors under Section 141 of
the Delaware Code and Section 8.01 of the Model Business
Corporation Act. Derivative suits can play an important role for
protecting minority shareholder rights in the private company setting.

II. EMPIRICAL DATA ON DERIVATIVE SUITS
A. The Data Set: DelawareLitigation at the Turn of the Century
Our data set of all corporate law complaints filed in Delaware
for a two-year period permits a systematic examination of derivative
66
litigation in the country's most important corporate law jurisdiction.
More than half of the country's largest companies are incorporated in
Delaware, and an even larger ratio of companies that have recently
gone public chose Delaware. But even those numbers understate the
importance of Delaware corporate law. The minority of companies
that incorporate outside of Delaware usually choose the state in which
they are headquartered. Looking only at companies that choose to
incorporate outside of the state where they have their headquarters,
Delaware has a greater than 85 percent share of the incorporation
market.6 7 Under the internal affairs doctrine, recognized generally by
American courts, corporate governance questions are decided under
the laws of the state of incorporation.68 Thus, while derivative suits
against public corporations do occur outside the state, the Delaware
courts capture the bulk of derivative litigation against public
companies.

64. Romano, supra note 2, at 84.
65. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 402 ("In almost all cases the legal fees generated exceed
the monetary payment to the shareholders.").
66. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 31-47 for an overview of the data. In this
paper, we focus more narrowly on the derivative lawsuits in our sample.
67. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J. L. &
ECON. 383, 395 (2003).
68. COX & HAZEN, supra note 55, at § 9.02.
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Under Delaware law, all corporate law cases are filed in the
Delaware Court of Chancery. 69 The great majority of cases filed in
this court relate to corporate law. Its five judges develop an expertise
in corporate law unrivaled by any other court in the country. We
looked at all complaints filed in the Chancery Court in 1999 and 2000.
Table 1: All Delaware Court of Chancery Cases 1999 & 2000
Total Complaints filed

1716

Corporate
Fiduciary Duty

1280 (75%)
1003

Statutory
Non Corporate

277
436 (25%)

Three-quarters of these cases related to corporate law, while
one-quarter related to trusts and other issues that come before an
equity court. Of the corporate law cases, most (78 percent) alleged
breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate directors or officers (usually
brought as derivative suits or class actions), while the remaining 22
percent raised various statutory issues. 70 These statutory rights cases
are most often brought by an individual shareholder as a direct suit
seeking to obtain, for example, a shareholder's meeting, or to ascertain
71
who is a director, or to ask for indemnification or appraisal.
B. Derivative Suits: Small Both in Absolute Number and as a Share of
CorporateLitigation
The fiduciary duty cases can be divided into three subgroups
depending on whether they are derivative suits, class actions or
72
individual (direct) claims.

69. The Chancery Court is a court of equity in which all Delaware corporate cases originate.
It was formed in 1792, and is the oldest of the Delaware courts. THE DELAWARE STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION, THE DELAWARE BAR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 395 (1994). As a court of equity,

its judges decide cases without a jury. See generally COURT OF CHANCERY, STATE OF DELAWARE
(1992) (for essays about the distinctive characteristics of that court).
70. Thus, in 1999 and 2000 there were 1,003 complaints raising fiduciary duty questions
and 277 complaints raising a statutory claim.
71. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 36-38 for further discussion of the statutory
cases.
72. The three types of suits total 1,048, which is 45 more than the total number of
complaints because a few suits have both class and derivative counts (22) or derivative and direct
counts in their complaints (15) or class and direct counts (2) or class, derivative and direct counts
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2: TYPES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY ACTIONS
..
Total.All Complaints
1048
824
137
87

Total Lead Cases
348
223
84
74

Somewhat surprisingly given the emphasis that derivative
suits receive in corporate law casebooks and in law review discussion,
they make up only 13 percent of the fiduciary duty complaints in our
study. During the 1999 and 2000 time period, only 137 complaints
made derivative claims versus 824 class action and 87 individual
direct complaints. 73 The class actions almost always arise in an
acquisition context, with the shareholders claiming that the managers
mishandled the sale of the company. They seek relief that would
provide additional consideration to each shareholder in a way that
makes the suit a class of individual claims. By contrast, derivative
claims produce recoveries to the corporation. The relative popularity
of class actions could stem from the fact that these plaintiffs avoid
some of the difficulties arising from the demand requirements and
74
other procedural provisions that apply to derivative suits.
Having reduced the set of 1716 Chancery cases down to 137
derivative suits, one additional division is useful in this initial data
presentation. Derivative suits are filed against both publicly held
corporations and close corporations. Eighty percent of the derivative
complaints (108) are brought against public companies with the
remaining 20 percent (26) against closely held companies
TABLE 3: DERIVATIVE SUITS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COMPANIES

Derivative
Public Entity
Private Entity
Not Available

137
108
26
3

83
57
25
2

in the same complaint (3). Lead cases refer to the number of cases remaining after all cases
arising out of the same controversy have been consolidated.
73. A few cases included both class and derivative counts in the same complaint or both
direct and derivative or all three. In such settings, they were counted as falling in each of the
categories meaning that the total number of observations increased from 1,003 to 1,048.
74. See supranotes 58-60.
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This contrasts with class actions, 98 percent of which are
brought against public companies (808 of 824 class actions we are
against publicly traded companies), and with direct suits, a majority of
which are brought against private firms (of eighty-seven direct suits,
thirty-six were against public companies and fifty-one against private
75
companies).
C. Private Company Suits

Delaware does not have the same dominant position as to close
corporations that it does as to public corporations. Its share of total
non-public incorporations is less than three and a half percent. 76 In
terms of litigation rights provided for resolving disputes within closely
held corporations, Delaware is on the trailing edge among all
American jurisdictions, refusing to provide dispute resolution devices
that others states have provided for close corporations. For example,
all but a dozen states have an "oppression" statute that authorizes
courts to grant relief if the majority has used the centralized power
provided by the corporations statute to frustrate the parties'
reasonable expectations. 77 A majority of states, including several of
the dozen that do not have an oppression statute, permit a broadened
use of direct suits in a close corporation such that a derivative suit is
not necessary. 78 If the dispute is really between only two sets of
shareholders, a derivative label is often an additional weapon of
majority control. Delaware, by contrast, has limited litigation rights,
reminding shareholders that their protection is not in the courts

75. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 167 tbl. 2. It would be possible to have
several hundred shareholders sufficient to generate the possibility of class status, but not to be
publicly traded.
76. In order to arrive at this estimate, we began with the IACA (International Association
of Corporate Administrators) 2002 Annual Report of Jurisdictions which reports incorporation
data for forty-six states. We used the data in Bebchuk and Cohen, supranote 67, at 395 tbl. 2 to
determine the number of publicly traded firms in forty-one of those states, including most of the
largest states. We then subtracted the number of public companies incorporated in each state
from the total number of firms incorporated in each state to arrive at an estimate of the number
of privately held firms incorporated in the states with the most incorporations. This gave us a
rough estimate of Delaware's share of the privately held incorporation market. Obviously the
number in the text overstates Delaware's share of all private incorporations because it omits
about 20 percent of the (mostly smaller) states.
77.

See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL AND THOMPSON'S OPPRESSION

OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 7.13 (2d ed. 2004) (identifying the thirty-eight
states that have oppression statutes).
78. Id. at § 7.08.
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applying principles of corporations law, but rather in self-help through
79
well-crafted contractual agreements.
Given these significant differences between Delaware law and
that of other states, what does our data tell us about the role played
by derivative suits in privately held Delaware corporations? Of the
twenty-five derivative suits filed against private companies in the
Delaware Chancery Court in 1999 and 2000 (one transaction having
generated two suits), eighteen were against corporations, five named
limited partnerships (both large and small) as defendants, one was
against a mutual company, and the last one was against a limited
liability company. Almost all companies had only a few investors.
The number of investors owning each of the companies is summarized
in Table 4 below.
Table 4: Number of Shareholders/ Other Investors in Closely
Held Complaints

2
3
4-8 (unrelated)
4-8 (family)
300 or more

7
6
6
2
4

Table 4 reveals how derivative suits are almost exclusively
filed in disputes among small groups of investors. In twenty-two out
of twenty-five cases,8 0 or 88 percent, derivative suits were used to
resolve disputes among eight or fewer investors. For these closely
held cases, about 40 percent of the companies were both based in
Delaware and incorporated under its laws. This percentage is much
higher than the percentage of public companies incorporated in
Delaware and headquartered there, as almost all of the Delaware
public companies are headquartered elsewhere. Thus, Delaware nonpublic derivative cases are often local disputes with local parties, but
unlike the corporate caseload in other states, these local disputes
make up only a small minority of the corporate cases before the state
judiciary.

79. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d. 1366, 1380-81 (Del. 1993).
80. The one case in which two complaints were filed involved a company with 300 or more
investors.
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Is private company derivative litigation focused on any
particular industry? The lines of business of the companies that are
the subject of derivative suits are somewhat concentrated. Of the
twenty-five closely held enterprise derivative cases, seven are in real
estate, six in Internet/computer/telecom businesses, and five grow out
of disputes in enterprises in the finance field (including mortgage
financing, insurance and consulting). The remaining six are spread
through individual lines of business, including pharmaceuticals,
furniture, and consumer goods.
Ownership in private companies is much more concentrated
than in public companies. Close company investors also tend to be
more actively involved in the business, making them superior
monitors of corporate mismanagement. Therefore, we expect to find
that these investors will be closely involved in any litigation arising
from allegations of corporate wrongdoing. These suits should not
exhibit the same indicia of litigation agency costs found in public
company derivative suits.
Our data support this hypothesis. Unlike the derivative suits
brought against public companies, the close corporation derivative
suits lack the indicia of litigation agency costs that appear in
derivative suits against public companies and other forms of
representative suits, such as class actions under state or federal law.
For example, in only one situation did the same controversy generate
more than one suit. By contrast, in derivative and class actions
against public companies, the same transaction generated up to fortyone separate suits. Moreover, unlike public company suits, in more
than half of the private company derivative cases, the complaint
joined an individual claim to the derivative claim.81 This illustrates
that the plaintiff in these cases also has individual rights at stake in
the suit.
Similarly, we do not find repeat plaintiffs filing these private
company cases, and only rarely do repeat law firms show up in these
suits. In previous work, we identified sixteen law firms that were
involved in about three quarters of all fiduciary duty class actions
brought under Delaware state law.8 2 Not surprisingly, the only
nonpublic companies in which these law firms appear are the mutual
and limited partnership cases that are in the category with more than
In short, the professional plaintiff and traditional
300 owners.
plaintiffs' bar are not players in close corporation litigation.

81. In fourteen of the twenty-five derivative cases, there were also claims framed as
individual or direct claims.
82. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 186-187.

1766

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:5:1747

What issues do these cases raise? Almost all of these cases
(twenty-one of twenty-five, or 84 percent) utilize duty of loyalty claims,
usually when there is a controlling shareholder.
Table 5: Allegations of Wrongdoing in Derivative suits Against
Non-Publicly Traded Companies

Self-Dealing Benefit to Managers
Improper Financial Record; Duty to Supervise
Acquisition
Other

21 (84%)
1 (4%)
2 (8%)
1 (4%)

Occasionally, a dispute ranged beyond a duty of loyalty claim,
as with a dispute over a buy/sell agreement between the two owners,
or involved limited partners complaining about the managers selling a
major asset too quickly. Yet even the latter claim contained an
allegation that the quick sale was on terms that benefited parties
affiliated with the manager. Furthermore, unlike the public company
class action cases brought in Delaware during this same period, where
94 percent attacked director actions in an acquisition, only a small
minority (two of twenty-five, or 8 percent) of the derivative cases
involving nonpublic companies occurred in an acquisition setting.
How successful are the plaintiffs in these cases? Table 6 shows
that about half of the derivative cases were dismissed with no relief,
although we find affirmative relief in about one-third of the cases. Of
those nine cases in which affirmative relief was granted, two targeted
large limited partnerships and one had a large mutual company
defendant.8 3 These types of entities are quite similar to publicly traded
companies, the defendants in the public company cases. In the
remaining five, two provided for money payments to minority owners,
two changed the allocation of ownership, and in one the complaining
shareholders sold their shares to the corporation.

83. The three cases are Truv-Serv Corp., C.A. No. 18236, a mutual company, and Winthrop
Miami Associates Limited Partnership, C.A. No. 17274 and Resources Accrued Mortgage
Investments, C.A. No. 18059, both limited partnerships.

DERIVATIVE LAWSUITS

2004]
TABLE

1767

6: DISPOSITION OF DERIVATIVE SUITS FOR CLOSELY HELD
COMPANIES

Pending
Inactive
Dismissed without prejudice
Dismissed with prejudice
Affirmative Relief Granted

3
1
3
9
9

When we look at how much actual litigation takes place in
these cases, we find that in 60 percent of the private company
derivative suits (fifteen out of twenty-five), substantive motions are
filed.84 By comparison, if we look at class action lawsuits filed against
private companies (most often limited partnerships), we see
dispositive motions filed in about 80 percent (eight of ten) of the cases.
Thus both of these forms of representative litigation against nonpublic
companies seem to be actively litigated.
Finally, we note that the procedural restrictions on derivative
suits appear to play little role in private company litigation. For
instance, demand is not often an issue in this group of cases. We
believe the reason is that the claim is usually a duty of loyalty claim
when the defendant is a majority shareholder who will not satisfy the
independence requirement necessary for a demand to be required
under case law. We found only two cases in which a court addressed a
86
demand issue, and in both cases it found that demand was excused.
To summarize our findings, private company derivative
litigation in Delaware plays little role in the governance of these
firms. Close corporation investors have a very limited set of litigation
options in Delaware compared to that available elsewhere. Few suits
are filed, and relief appears to be obtained in less than half of the
cases. While this may reflect a superior private ordering system that
makes litigation unnecessary to the resolution of internal corporate
disputes, it could also demonstrate such incredible weakness of
minority shareholder rights in Delaware that such suits simply are
not filed.

84. We define substantive motions to include motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
motions for summary judgment, and motions to dismiss for failure to make demand.
85. See Beneville v. York, 769 A.2d 80, 82 (Del. Ch. 2000) (excusing demand where one
member of a two-member board could not impartially consider demand request) and Parfi
Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 794 A.2d 1211, 1230-31 (Del. Ch. 2001) (requiring
arbitration; alternative holding that demand excused).
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D. Public Company Derivative Litigation:Do They Have High
LitigationAgency Costs?
In evaluating the impact of derivative lawsuits against public
companies, we need to look at both the costs associated with them and
the benefits realized from them. In this section, we focus on the
litigation agency costs that are claimed to be generated by these suits,
and in the next section we turn to their benefits to shareholders.
Derivative suits against public companies differ from their
counterparts in a nonpublic setting in that they are representative
suits brought by one shareholder for the benefit of a large body of
shareholders. In that sense, public company derivative suits could
share the same indicia of litigation agency costs (that is, that the
agent bringing the suit for the group may not have the same interests
as the entire group) as other representative suits, such as securities
fraud class actions or state law fiduciary duty class actions that arise
in an acquisition context. In earlier work,8 6 we identified the common
indicia of representative litigation associated with nuisance suits,
including the speed with which suits are filed (if there are multiple
suits filed for the same transaction) and whether there are repeat law
firms involved in the suits.
Our data reveal that derivative suits share some of these
characteristics but that these costs are not as pronounced as they are
for class actions. To illustrate this point, we present comparable data
for derivative suits against nonpublic companies, derivative suits
against public companies, and state law class actions against public
companies.
1. Multiple suits per controversy
For state class actions against public companies, we found
there were almost four suits filed per transaction.8 7 With derivative
suits against public companies, this drops sharply. As shown in Table
7 below, almost two-thirds of transactions that produced a state class
action filing generated more than one lawsuit per case, with the
number ranging up to forty-one separate suits. For derivative suits
against public firms, about half generated only one derivative suit per
transaction and seldom were there more than two such suits. For the
two years of our study, the 108 public company derivative complaints

86.
87.

Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 152-57.
Id. at 161-62.
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reflected fifty-seven disputes, an average of just under two suits for
Federal securities fraud class actions have
every transaction.
exhibited a level of suits per transaction similar to the public company
88
derivative actions.
TABLE 7: SUITS PER TRANSACTION OR CONTROVERSY

Derivative (nonpublic)
Derivative (public)
Fiduciary Duty Class Action (public)

1.04 (26/25)
1.90 (108/57)
3.79 (808/213)

2. Recurring plaintiff firms
Derivative suits, like state class action suits based on fiduciary
duty, are representative suits in which the lawyer often has the
largest economic incentive to pursue the litigation. In our earlier
study of Delaware class action litigation, we found that sixteen law
firms were involved in 75 percent of the state law class actions
brought in the two years covered by our study.8 9 n even higher degree
of concentration in law firms is exhibited in the securities fraud class
action area, where the firm of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach
is said to appear in more than 50 percent of these cases. 90
While there are several possible implications of this degree of
concentration, most commentators view it as an indicia of high
litigation agency costs. As Table 8 shows, when we look at public
company derivative suits, the number brought by the same sixteen
firms drops to just about 45 percent. 91 This appears to indicate a
lower level of litigation agency costs for these suits. Finally, in the
private company derivative suits, we see a small percentage (12
percent) of these representative lawsuits are filed by one of these
firms.

88. Id.
89. Id. at 185-87.
90. Id. at 162. In 2004, this firm split into two firms.
91. These sixteen firms do bring a larger share of the derivative suits brought against the
larger companies listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ (twenty-one of forty-two or 50 percent)
versus only three of thirteen brought against other public firms.
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TABLE 8: PRESENCE OF REPEAT PLAINTIFF FIRM

Derivative (nonpublic)
Derivative (public)

12% (3 of 25)
44% (25 of 57)

Fiduciary Duty Class Action
(public)

75%

3. Suits are filed quickly
We next examine if there is a difference in how quickly the
lawsuits are filed as a third potential indicator of high litigation
agency costs. As Table 9 illustrates, two-thirds (508 of 760) of the
class actions were filed within three days of the event described as
triggering the claim.9 2 Securities fraud class actions are claimed to
have similarly fast filing times prior to the enactment of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).9 3 For derivative
suits against public companies, the number of suits filed this quickly
is only 11 percent (nine of seventy-eight) of the total claims for which
94
the time of the triggering event could be determined.
Table 9: Filing Times for Complaints

Number of
Class Action
Suits Filed
Number of
Derivative
Suits Filed

508

92

46

57

57

63

9

6

6

20

37

59

92. In sixty-three cases the time between the transaction and the filing could not be
determined.
93. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 162-63. Post-PSLRA the filing times for federal
securities fraud cases have increased dramatically. Id.
94. There were fifty-nine complaints in which the time between the wrong and the filing
could not be determined, about 43 percent of all derivative complaints and a much higher
percentage than for class actions.
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4. Suits targeted at particular industries
In recent debates over the alleged abuses of representative
litigation, particularly prior to the enactment of the PSLRA,
opponents of representative litigation claimed that suits were targeted
toward particular industries, such as those in the high tech corridor of
Silicon Valley.9 5 To test whether public company derivative suits
might suffer from similar biases, we identified the headquarters of the
companies that were subject to the suit and their principal industry.
We found that the percentage of derivative suits that involved
companies headquartered in California (10 percent) was less than that
state's share of the country's population and less than the share of
state class action suits brought against companies headquartered in
California (16 percent). Internet and computer companies made up
about 19 percent of the companies subject to derivative suits; about
the same percentage as those companies made up for the sample of
state class action suits, but each of those numbers is lower than the
96
share of those industries in federal securities class action suits.
Public company derivative claims relate to corporations that
are generally larger than the public companies against which state
law class actions are brought. Table 10A shows that the largest
percentage of public company derivative suits are brought against
New York Stock Exchange companies, with an additional 30 percent
against target companies listed with NASDAQ.
TABLE 10A- TYPE OF ENTITY SUED

NYSE
Nasdaq
Small public

25 (44%)
16 (28%)
16 (28%)

98 (46%)
81 (38%)
34 (16%)

Table 10B shows that among public companies, the subject
companies in derivative suits are larger than the companies who are
the targets of state class action suits based on fiduciary duty. These
distributions are statistically significantly different at the less than
97
the 1 percent level.

95.

Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 163.

96.

Id. at 173.

97. The two distributions are not normally distributed, so we use the Wilcoxon two-sample
rank test to make the comparison. For a discussion of the Wilcoxon two-sample rank test, see
DAVID R. ANDERSON ET AL., STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 813 (7th. ed. 1999).
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10B- MARKET CAP OF COMPANIES SUED

$219 Million
$1.138 Billion
$6.15 Billion

$118 Million
$389 Million
$1.39 Billion

These differences are driven by derivative suits that allege
improper financial records, failure to supervise, or misleading
statements, all of -which are usually filed against very large
companies.
5. Why Do Public Company Derivative Suits Have Lower Litigation
Agency Costs than Other Types of Representative Litigation?
Thus we see that public company derivative suits have
consistently lower levels of the indicia of litigation agency costs than
do class action suits filed in the same court or federal securities class
actions. The other striking finding is that there are relatively few of
these cases being filed in comparison to the number of state court
class actions or federal securities fraud class actions. What could
explain these two important findings?
An examination of the types of problems derivative suits
address reveals a partial explanation. Table 11 illustrates the nature
of the claims made in our public company suits.
Table 11: Allegations of Wrongdoing in Derivative Suits
Against Non-Publicly Traded Companies

Self-Dealing Benefit to Managers
Improper Financial Record; Duty to Supervise
Acquisition
Misleading Statements
Charter Amendment
Other

28 (49%)
15 (26%)
6(11%)
4(7%)
1(2%)
3 (5%)

Almost half (twenty-eight of fifty-seven lead cases that are
derivative suits) make claims of self-dealing against managers,
officers, or both. In addition, six cases (11 percent) occur in a merger
or transactional setting, virtually always claiming a breach of the duty
of loyalty by the managers/controlling shareholders for negotiating the
terms to favor their own interests over those of another group of
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Thus, almost 60 percent of the complaints raise
shareholders.
principally a duty of loyalty claim.
The remaining 40 percent of the complaints are quite different.
More than one quarter (fifteen out of fifty-seven) raise allegations that
generally would come under the directors' duty of care, as opposed to
loyalty, such as allegations of improper financial records or failure to
supervise. Four cases (7 percent) raise claims asserting misleading
statements. These are all claims that probably could have been made
in federal securities fraud class actions if the plaintiffs had chosen to
pursue that avenue.
The data in Table 11 may illustrate that plaintiffs' law firms
have a choice of forum for many derivative cases, allowing them to
choose to file a state court class action, a federal securities class
action, or a derivative suit based on the same underlying facts. We
hypothesize that the reason that there are relatively few derivative
suits against public companies is that the procedural barriers to filing
derivative suits, in particular the demand requirement and the
possibility of the appointment of a special litigation committee, may
discourage the plaintiffs' bar from filing derivative actions in
circumstances where they could bring the same claims in an
alternative manner or venue. Moreover, in the duty of care area,
Delaware's statutory provision that permits companies to include a
provision in their certificates of incorporation that exculpates their
officers and directors from monetary liability for breach of the duty of
care has undoubtedly led plaintiffs to file these cases in federal court
as securities fraud class actions.9 8
Our hypothesis may account for why there are hundreds of
class action complaints challenging director conduct in acquisitions
but only six derivative suits containing similar claims, with all of
those six being companion cases to class actions. 99 Moreover, with
regard to claims that could be filed in federal court, such as suits
alleging either improper financial records or failure to monitor officer
conduct, we find only a handful of public company derivative suits,
while there are hundreds of federal securities law cases filed every
00
year.1
If we are correct, then plaintiffs' lawyers will only choose to file
a derivative case when they either are certain they can satisfy the
98. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
99. While the PSLRA preempted state court jurisdiction over most class actions alleging
claims that could be construed as raising issues under the federal securities laws, it continues to
permit shareholders to file class actions challenging director conduct in change of control
transactions in the state courts. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1) (1999).
100. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 168-169.
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demand requirement or have no other possible venue or type of claim
to file. If this were so, we would expect to find that most public
company cases are brought where demand is excused and that there
would be relatively low levels of litigation over the demand
requirement. 1 1 This would explain the small number of these public
company suits in comparison to the state court class actions or federal
securities fraud cases.
The higher barriers to bringing a successful derivative suit
could also explain the lower level of the indicia of litigation agency
costs we find associated with these suits. For example, a strong
plaintiffs' law firm, which is experienced in shareholder litigation,
would be likely to know that these suits face higher hurdles. If all of
these firms know this is true, then as a group they (1) will be less
likely to file derivative cases against any transaction (fewer suits per
transaction and fewer appearances by the top plaintiffs' firms); (2) will
know that they need to make sure they can satisfy the demand
requirement before filing a complaint (longer filing time); and (3) will
generally use this form of litigation only as a last resort or in a
particularly appropriate situation (such as a more dispersed group of
defendants).
E. The Benefits of Derivative Suits with Public Company Defendants
Having discussed the cost part of the picture in terms of
evaluating derivative suits, we now turn to the benefits of derivative
suits. The results produced by derivative suits filed against public
companies have been an important part of the debate over the
effectiveness of these representative suits. The most biting claim
against them has been that they almost never produce real recovery
for shareholders and that the lawyers representing investors make out
much better than the investors themselves.1 0 2 Our data suggests that
current public company derivative suits do not fit that traditional
story.
There are two main benefits that result from derivative suits:
(1) the deterrence of corporate wrongdoing provided by their very
existence, and (2) the possibility that the suits yield a positive net
recovery for shareholders. 10 3 Empirical studies often overlook the

101. See Part III. infra for further analysis of this point.
102. Romano, supra note 2, at 84.
103. Kraakman et al., supra note 1, at 1736.
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benefits of deterrence 10 4 because researchers cannot precisely quantify
its effects. While we do not know what percentages of frauds or selfdealing transactions are deterred because of the possibility of being
exposed or challenged in shareholder litigation, the probability of
detection of corporate wrongdoing is greater when private plaintiffs
are able to pursue such actions. 10 5 Therefore, we need to count this as
a benefit in comparing the costs and benefits of derivative suits.
Turning to the data on the value of settlements in our sample,
Table 12 presents the outcomes of these suits. 106 More than half of the
suits ended with no relief: of fifty-seven lead cases brought against
public corporations, thirty-four were dismissed with no relief. In
twenty-one of these cases, the dismissal was without prejudice. In
another six cases, the dismissal was with prejudice. In the remaining
seven suits, the dismissal followed a defendant's victory on a motion
relating to demand or summary judgment.
Affirmative relief was granted in sixteen (or 28 percent) of the
lead cases. In six of these sixteen, the plaintiffs received monetary
relief. In ten others there was no monetary relief paid to investors,
but there was other relief, such as rescission of a purchase agreement
or payment of attorneys' fees. Seven cases remain open. In one of
these seven, the plaintiff won in preliminary legal skirmishes in which
the court ruled that demand was excused. 107

104. See James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3, 4-5
(1999) (arguing that the deterrent value of shareholder litigation is tied to the public's perception
of the value of such litigation).
105. Donald E. Schwartz, In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary on the Paper of
Professors Fischel and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 322, 323 (1986) ("Liability rules, enforced by
shareholder litigation, are theoretically sound and profoundly affect the conduct of corporate
managers"); see James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics:An Empirical
Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 763-64 (2003) (concluding that while the SEC pursues many fraud
cases, private plaintiffs act to supplement its enforcement efforts). But see Daniel R. Fischel &
Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 262-63 (1986) (arguing that the
premise that managers' legal liability in shareholder litigation will reduce agency costs of equity
is "far from obvious" because corporate managers act in shareholders' best interests already and
because liability rules "play little or no role in creating incentives for beneficial conduct.").
106. We note that these data present gross recoveries for shareholders. We do not have data
on the costs that the corporation has to bear in these suits, which we would need in order to
calculate net recoveries.
107. In re The Student Loan Corp. Derivative Lit., C.A. No.17799, 2002 WL 75479, at *3
(Del. Ch. Jan. 8, 2002).
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12: DISPOSITION OF DERIVATIVE SUITS AGAINST PUBLIC
COMPANIES

Dismissed With No Relief
Dismissed Without Prejudice
Dismissed With Prejudice
Dismissed After Defendants Prevail on Motion
Cases Providing Relief
Monetary Relief to Plaintiff
Non-Substantive Relief Including Attorneys Fees
Cases Open

34 (60%)
21
6
7
16 (28%)
6
10
7 (12%)

The six cases that produced cash payments show the strong
interconnection of derivative suits and other litigation. In one suit
(Olsten), the settlement went directly into a securities settlement for a
related suit alleging the stock had been artificially inflated by the
corporation's systematic failure to take steps regarding Medicare
billing.1 08 In another (Anchor Glass), the settlement went toward the
settlement of bankruptcy reorganization.10 9 In four, management
conduct related to an acquisition and the settlement led to additional
payments to the corporation or to the shareholders. 1 0° Of the sixteen
lawsuits that produced affirmative relief described in Tables 13 and
14, six complaints (or 37.5 percent) included both derivative and class
counts in their complaint. In contrast, for derivative cases that did
not result in any kind of affirmative relief, only five of forty-two
complaints (or 11.9 percent) included both class action and derivative
counts in the complaint. Table 13 presents the data for monetary
relief in publicly held entities.

108. Olsten Corp., C.A. No. 17135.
109. Anchor Glass Container Corp., C.A. No. 18417.
110. Digex Corp., C.A. No. 18336; M&F Worldwide, C.A. No. 18502; Plains All-American Ltd.
P'ship, C.A. No. 17627; Bank of America Corp., C.A. No. 16964.
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TABLE 13A: MONETARY RELIEF IN DERIVATIVE CASES AGAINST
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

Digex
C.A. #18336

Majority shareholder merged
with acquirer instead of selling
subsidiary

$165 M
(both class and
derivative actions)

$12 M

M&F
C.A. #18502

Corporation paying too much
for another corp. owned by 32%
shareholder

$140 M
(estimated)
(Treated as class
for settlement)

$12.154 M

Olsten
C.A. #17135

Systematic failure in
monitoring Medicare billing

$11 M(paid
directly into
securities
settlement)

$900 K

Plains AllAmerican
C.A. #17627

Management self-dealing
around time of acquisition

$10.6 M

$1.05 M

Anchor Glass
C.A. #18417

$9.33 M (paid to
bankruptcy
proceeding)

$2.5 M

BankAmerica

Challenging series of
transactions between
corporation and controlled
group
Goodbye fee paid to directors

$2.5 M

$250 K

C.A. #16964

in acquisition

The three larger settlements producing relief for non-publicly
traded entities discussed earlier are reproduced in Table 13B to give a
more complete picture of the derivative transactions from which
The complaints in two of these three
monetary relief results.
(Resources and Winthrop) included both derivative and class action
counts, but all three provided for immediate payouts to the group of
owners. Derivative litigation has long provided for direct recovery
within a derivative suit."' These cases show that in a large number of
derivative cases courts find a direct recovery is appropriate, either by
finding the derivative claim is a class action for settlement purposes or
by approving a settlement which includes immediate payment to the
owners.

111. See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1955) (providing for
individual recovery where corporate recovery would have primarily benefited those who were
said to have breached their fiduciary duty).
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TABLE 13B: MONETARY RELIEF IN DERIVATIVE CASES AGAINST
LARGER BUT NOT PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS

Wlnthror

(limited
partnership)
Resources
Associated
Mortgage
(limited
partnership)
Tru-Serv
(mutual co.)

Misrepresentation in getting
limited partners to vote for sale of
assets on terms benefiting GP

$9,750,000

$1.8 M

General partner's sale of assets as
waste and self-dealing

$9,000,000

$1.8 M

Change in withdrawal rights

$5,000,000

$725 K

The cases in Table 13A include the most visible of the
derivative suits. In the Digex litigation, Intermedia, the majority
shareholder of Digex, agreed to merge with WorldCom instead of
selling Digex, which plaintiffs alleged diverted the gain attributable to
Digex. The settlement reports $165 million paid to the Digex minority
shareholders with attorneys' fees of $12 million. M&F Worldwide
involved group of companies affiliated with high-profile financier
Ronald Perelman. The corporation (32 percent owned by a Perelman
affiliate) was alleged to have paid too much in buying another
corporation in which the insiders had a much larger ownership. The
lawsuit was settled by unwinding the challenged transaction
estimated by some plaintiffs to provide a benefit of $140 million to the
corporation with $12.154 million in attorneys' fees awarded.
In the suits producing non-monetary relief, shown in Table 14,
two of the cases included rescission of a purchase agreement, and one
provided for rescission of substantial executive compensation. In three
other claims arising out of an acquisition, the settlements contain no
specific relief other than attorneys' fees. In those cases, a takeover
resulted very quickly. 112 In the last four cases, non-monetary relief
seemed less substantial. One produced corporate governance changes
and $100,000 in attorneys' fees; another corrected a scrivener's error
in a merger agreement with $75,000 in attorneys' fees; a third
involved repricing stock options and attorneys' fees of $17,000; and the

112. These takeovers resulted in the company's shareholders being bought out at substantial

premiums. General Housewares, C.A. No. 17192; JSB, C.A. No. 17741; Kenetech C.A. 17702.
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last permitted inspection but awarded no attorneys' fees and awarded
costs to the defendant. The important things to note are that in the
nonmonetary settlements, there were very real gains for shareholders
fees is appropriate when
in some cases and that an award of attorneys'
11 3
the shareholders benefit from the litigation.
TABLE 14: NONMONETARY RELIEF IN INDIVIDUAL DERIVATIVE
CASES AGAINST PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

had

deal

Ascent Entern.

CEO

C.A. # 17201

proposed purchaser

Waste

Inappropriate

Management

compensation

with

executive

Rescind purchase

$4M

$23 million in

Sale to another
bidder

agreement
$1.6M

cancelled executive
compensation

C.A. # 17318
TII

Company acquisition of

Withdrew purchase

C.A. 17032

company co-owned by

agreement

$275K

Company
continues to
lease until July

founder

2002
Gen. Housewares

Board rejected hostile bid

#17192

and took defensive tactics

JSB

Board put company up for

C.A. 17741

sale and took nominally 2d

$75K

Acquisition
successful

$300K

Acquisition
successful

highest bid
Kenetech

CEO's purchase of 27%

C.A. 17702

block said to be corporate

$146K

Acquisition
successful

opportunity
RSA

Agreement predating IPO

Corporate governance

C.A. #18107

with VP who also was

change

$100K

President of a possible
competitor
Union Financial

Challenging stock

Correcting scrivener's

C.A. # 17392

issuance and other actions

error in agreement

Acap

Challenging

C.A. # 17140

with brother of executive

Siebel

Repricing of nonstatutory
options to CEO

#18150

transaction

$75K

Additional disclosure

$17K

Inspection

$0

113. Cf. Mark J. Loewenstein, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and Corporate Governance,
24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (1999) (Courts should not approve attorneys' fees in derivative litigation
"unless the settlement (1) generates a common fund out of which such fees may be paid, (2)
produces an intangible benefit reasonably susceptible of valuation, or (3) reflects a strong nexus
between the relief sought in the complaint and the relief obtained.").
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Finally, we have data about the frequency with which
substantive motions are filed in these cases. For the fifty-seven public
company cases in our sample, we find that substantive motions were
filed prior to settlement in thirty-eight of them, or about two-thirds of
the time. In contrast, if we look at public company class action
litigation, we find that only 41 percent (88 out of 213) of lead cases
had substantive motions filed. Thus, it appears that the public
company derivative cases are more heavily litigated than their class
action counterparts.
To sum up the results of our empirical analysis of the benefits
of public company derivative actions, a substantial minority of these
suits resulted in large monetary damage awards to investors. A
second group of cases led to non-monetary relief for shareholders,
yielding less quantifiable but still significant gains. The remaining
suits, a majority of the sample, were dismissed with no relief, most
frequently without prejudice.
III. DEMAND IN DERIVATIVE SUITS
Both the Delaware Chancery Court rules of procedure and the
corporations statutes of many states require that a plaintiff
shareholder make a demand on directors prior to bringing a derivative
suit, unless such demand would be futile.11 4 This requirement is at
the center of most current academic discussions about derivative suits.
Beginning about twenty-five years ago, defendants in derivative suits
began to appoint special litigation committees to respond to derivative
suits. In a series of highly visible cases, Delaware approved actions by
such a committee to terminate derivative suits with a degree of
judicial review that comes close to the deference of the business
judgment rule. The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Zapata
Corp v. Maldonado continued a more intrusive level of judicial review
when demand has been excused as futile,1 1 5 but the court's subsequent
case Aronson v. Lewis reduced dramatically the number of cases that
16 The increased litigation that
would be considered under Zapata.1
comes with the demand requirement is one of the principal reasons
that litigants, where possible, seek to bring class actions, for which the
demand requirement does not apply. The eight-to-one relationship
114. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.40 et seq.
115. 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981).
116. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814-15 (Del. 1984). Because of Aronson, the number of
cases that fall into Zapata is small. A rare example of a Delaware case applying Zapata is
Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d. 501, 505 (Del. Ch. 1984).
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between the number of class actions as compared to derivative suits
reported in Table 2 likely reflects this legal requirement.
Other states have taken a different view of demand. 117 Indeed,
this may be the area in which there is the most difference between
Delaware and other states as to the law governing public corporations.
Furthermore, some states have limited the ability of special
committees to dismiss derivative suits. 118 At the same time, many
states, including those following a revision to the Model Business
Corporation Act, have inserted a provision requiring a demand on
directors in every case. 119 This precludes lengthy litigation over
whether making a demand is futile, but it moves the judicial focus to
the appropriate level of judicial review of a committee decision to
recommend termination of the suit. The Model Act contains an
elaborate test with a shifting burden of proof depending on the degree
20
of independence of the board appointing the special committee.
There have been few published opinions interpreting such language,
showing how dominant Delaware law remains. In the face of such
lack of interpretation, it would not be at all surprising if states asked
to interpret such a provision looked to Delaware precedent, resulting
in convergence between Delaware and the other states to a much
greater degree than the difference in statutory language might
suggest.
We have few cases in our derivative suit sample in which a
special litigation committee is utilized. We found only one case in our
data set in which a recommendation by a special committee led to
dismissal of a claim. 12 ' In another case, the appointment of a special
litigation committee after the suit was filed led to a settlement in
which payment was made to three shareholders collectively owning 40
percent of the company.122
117. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Demand in Derivative Actions: Problems of
Interpretationand Function, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 461, 462 (1986). One commentator on this
paper claimed that the Delaware courts are much tougher on demand than the courts in other
states, even when those courts purport to be applying Delaware law. This commentator stated
that this led plaintiffs lawyers to file derivative actions against Delaware corporations in the
state where they are headquartered rather than in the Delaware Chancery Court.
118. See, e.g., Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983)
(excusing demand due to potential for structural bias on litigation committee resulting from
their appointment by directors).
119. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT Annotated § 7.42 (adopted by Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
120. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.44.

121. Letter opinion of Chancellor William B. Chandler, Kindt v. Lund, C.A, No.17751 (Del.
Ch. May 30, 2003).
122. DE Commercial Inc., C.A. No. 18180.

1782

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:5:1747

Our data provides a detailed look at demand cases filed during
a two-year period. We did not find a single example in which the
complaint said that a demand had been made on the directors. Given
the demand requirement outlined above, an allegation to support the
futility of demand is an essential part of all derivative cases, both in
We found that the demand
public and private corporations.
allegations in the complaints were not always fully developed. Most,
but not all, of the complaints state the number of directors, a crucial
fact because Delaware law requires that demand will not be excused
unless there is a showing that a majority of the directors were unable
to make a disinterested or informed decision on behalf of the
corporation. In terms of pleading futility, complaints typically alleged
that some or all of the directors were conflicted. A second category
alleged that directors were not disinterested because of employment in
the corporation. A third group of complaints added directors alleged
to be disabled from making a decision because of other relationships
that compromised independence. A fourth argument for futility is
based on a single self-interested shareholder's dominance of the board.
A fifth category alleged no demand because of the board's failure to
meet its duty of care. Finally, a sixth category, found in acquisition
cases, alleged futility because of an entrenchment motive of the board.
We found all of these reasons alleged as set forth in Table 15. We also
found numerous examples where the face of the complaint failed to
allege facts that a majority of directors were disqualified from passing
judgment on a demand or did not address demand in any detail.
Derivative counts that were joined with class action counts in the
same complaint explain some of this last group.
TABLE 15- DEMAND FUTILITY ALLEGATIONS IN COMPLAINTS

Majority conflicted
Majority disabled by combining conflicted and
employed
Majority disabled by also adding other indirect reason
challenging independence
Domination
Duty of care
Waste
Complaint alleges futility reason only for a minority
Complaint lacks futility specifics

12
10
4
8
5
5
6
7
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Given the perceived centrality of demand in derivative
litigation and the lack of precision in many of the complaints on this
issue, it was somewhat surprising that in only eight cases, a Chancery
Court judge made a ruling on demand (six against public
corporations-ll percent of all lead cases brought against public
corporations--and two against nonpublic corporations). Of that subset
of eight, defendants were successful in five of the public company
cases, meaning the claims were dismissed for failure to make
demand.123 In the other three cases, a Chancery Court judge found
124
that demand was excused, including two private company cases.
Cases dismissed for failure to make demand comprised only about
one-quarter of the cases that were dismissed without relief. The cases
that were dismissed for not showing futility were spread across five of
the factual allegation categories described in Table 15.125 It is
noteworthy that three of the five dismissals for failure to show futility
were in cases alleging financial irregularities or failure to supervise,
and the other two were in acquisition transactions. That is, none of
the dismissals for failure to show futility arose in a conflict of interest
case. The one public company case in which demand futility was
accepted was a case alleging self-dealing. Thus demand seems to be
doing most of its work in derivative cases outside of the duty of loyalty
cases. Overall, however, demand does not appear to be carrying as
much of the weight of derivative litigation as one might think given
the attention devoted to that topic in the academic literature and case
commentary.
Why might this be the case? Recall our earlier discussion of
how plaintiffs' law firms have a choice of forum for many derivative
cases, which often gives them the option of filing a state court class
action, or a federal securities class action on the same underlying fact
pattern. 126 In that discussion, we hypothesized that the plaintiffs' bar
would select derivative actions from their set of options only in
circumstances in which they could either satisfy the demand
requirement or have no other possible venue or type of claim to file. If

123. Paxson Communications, C.A. No. 17568; Priceline, C.A. No. 18473; Delta Pine, C.A.
No. 17707; RiteAid, C.A. No. 17740; McKesson, C.A. No. 17132.
124. See In re The Student Loan Corp. Derivative Litig., No. C.A.17799, 2002 WL 75479, at
*3 (Del. Ch. 2002) (demand excused where board of public corporation not impartial); Beneville v.
York, 769 A.2d 80, 82 (Del. Ch. 2000) (demand excused); Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image
Internet, Inc., 794 A.2d 1211, 1230-31 (Del. Ch. 2001) (alternative holding that demand excused).
125. There was one each in the 'Majority Self-interested Category," the "Majorityindependence
Category," "Domination," "Minority-only allegations," and "Incomplete
Allegations."
126. See supra Part II.D.5.
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we are correct, this would explain why we find relatively low levels of
litigation over the demand requirement for public companies.
For private companies, demand will typically be excused.
Remember that in small closely held firms, the investors are typically
also directors and officers of the company. There are not usually any
independent directors, and firms are therefore less able to claim
successfully that demand is required.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF OUR RESULTS

Our empirical data about derivative suits helps us to
understand the role that they currently play in corporate governance.
The picture that emerges is that derivative suits against public
companies play a very different role than they do against private
companies. What are the policy implications of these findings? We
discuss each setting separately.
A. Private Company Derivative Suits
As we noted earlier, Delaware's governance system for private
firms is different from those in other states.
Delaware has no
involuntary dissolution statute and does not recognize oppression
remedies that are widely available to minority shareholders of close
corporations in other states. As a result, shareholders of Delaware
privately held firms have three types of remedies: direct suits,
derivative suits, and private contractual remedies.
Well-advised shareholders will undoubtedly avail themselves of
the privately negotiated protections that they and their advisers
prudently put into place at the formation of their firm, or at least prior
to the development of any serious problems between the investors.
However, as all teachers and scholars of corporate law know, not all
investors are far-sighted enough to foresee their future problems.
Furthermore, even the best-advised investors may fail to predict a
particular problem and thus need to devise an ex post solution. The
absence of a liquid market for the firm's stock will complicate matters,
as it removes one readily available solution. This suggests that
litigation will play an important role in many privately held firms in
resolving disputes amongst their shareholders.
We find little evidence that derivative litigation does much of
the heavy lifting in Delaware. Few derivative suits are filed against
private firms, and only a small fraction of these suits result in any
relief for the plaintiffs. On a positive note, we find almost no
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indication of high litigation agency costs in these suits, and no
effective procedural barriers to their litigation.
One possible explanation for our findings could be that direct
actions are the preferred vehicle for minority shareholders in private
company litigation, perhaps because any recovery will go to the
shareholder rather than the firm. 127 There were about twice as many
direct actions filed against private companies as there were derivative
actions. When those cases that include both direct and derivative
counts are eliminated, the margin of direct suits over derivative suits
increases to a three-to-one margin. Affirmative recovery occurs in all
three categories. The small number of cases in each category makes it
difficult to draw additional conclusions regarding outcomes in the
three categories. 128 A second possibility is that Delaware's insistence
that investors rely on private ordering remedies has led to the greater
use of such provisions among its closely held firms. This might be
especially likely if the private firm is not headquartered in Delaware
but specifically elected to be incorporated there to select its unique
close corporation regulatory structure. Thus, if an out-of-state firm
chooses to incorporate in Delaware, it could well be that sophisticated
counsel intended to provide contractual protections for its investors in
129
lieu of those judicially and legislatively provided elsewhere.
In terms of policy conclusions, we note that the low level of
litigation agency costs associated with these suits argues in favor of
relaxing any procedural barriers that stand in their way. However, as
discussed earlier, the existing hurdles do not stop any private
company derivative cases in our sample. In short, there does not
appear to be much demand by plaintiffs to bring these cases, either
because direct actions provide a better vehicle for obtaining relief, or
private ordering is effective, or there are relatively few Delaware
private corporations.

127. As we noted earlier, however, the plaintiff can seek an individual recovery in a
derivative suit if putting the money back in the firm would not provide an adequate remedy.
Supra note 56.
128. There were forty-eight direct suits against nonpublic companies and twenty-five
derivative suits, with fourteen in each category that also include a count raising the other kind of
claim.
129. A more sinister possibility is that Delaware was selected by a control shareholder
primarily because it does not provide minority shareholders with much protection. It would be
interesting to compare the number of privately held companies by state and the private company
litigation rates across states to see if there are significant differences. We lack the data at this
point to test this hypothesis.
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B. Public Company DerivativeSuits
Theory tells us that in U.S. public corporations with dispersed
ownership structures, where there are markets, independent directors
and other checks on corporate misconduct, representative shareholder
derivative suits have a monitoring role to play in corporate
governance. While others have claimed that derivative suits are the
evil stepsister among the potential monitors and are thereby better off
banished from the kingdom, our data show that in some circumstances
derivative suits can be a valuable part of public company shareholder
monitoring.
To briefly recap those findings, the bulk of all public company
derivative suits challenge conflict of interest transactions, and in
those derivative cases that produce affirmative relief, the majority
relate to acquisition transactions, in which the plaintiffs allege that a
control shareholder group has a conflict of interest. Acquisitions
involve directors in a final period problem, in which the law could
have a greater role, even if there are independent directors. These
cases almost uniformly allege breaches of the duty of loyalty by
directors.
Delaware has ceded the area of directors' duty of care to the
federal realm. Our cases illustrate this point vividly: of the cases that
have produced affirmative relief, the only one that does not focus on
the conflict of the entity's core managers is one in which the
settlement was paid directly into a securities class action. After the
Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom,
imposing liability on directors for breach of their duty of care, 130 the
Delaware legislature (followed by legislatures in the other states)
quickly passed a statute permitting a corporation to include a
provision in its articles of incorporation exculpating its officers and
directors from monetary liability related to the duty of care.13 1 It is
very rare for a public company not to have taken advantage of this
exculpation. 132 As a result, the Delaware judiciary, the ten judges that
make almost all of American corporations law and who are the only
judges in the country who have enough repeat business to become
experts in the area, is left unable to hear many of the cases that relate
to corporate governance.
Events outside of Delaware have cast doubt on the continued
viability of the public company derivative suit. The adoption of the
130. 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985).
131. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).

132. Lawrence Hamermesh, Fiduciary Duty, Limited Liability and the Law of Delaware:
Why IDo Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477, 479 (2000).
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new listing standards by the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ
will increase the number of independent directors on the largest
public companies' boards of directors. All public corporations now
must have a majority of independent directors, and three core board
committee-the audit, compensation, and nominating/governance
committees-must be composed entirely of independent directors. As
a result, it will be more difficult for a plaintiff to show that demand
should be excused by claiming that a majority of the board is disabled
from acting for the corporation. This will make it harder to sustain
derivative suits.
1. Should Delaware take action to make derivative suits easier to
bring?
In light of our results, and the changes in listing standards,
should Delaware consider opening up the doors to more derivative law
suits? To answer this question, we need to focus on duty of loyalty
cases separately from duty of care cases. In duty of loyalty cases, we
find that derivative suits are already bringing some significant
benefits to investors with relatively low litigation agency costs. With
the adoption of the new listing standards, boards will have more
independent directors to monitor conflict of interest transactions. The
hard question is whether independent directors are better monitors of
conflict of interest transactions than the Delaware courts.
Certainly to the extent that outside directors are truly
disinterested and acting in good faith, their superior knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding each transaction at the time of its
approval should make them the best judges of whether it is in the
firm's best interests. However, it is a stylized fact of the corporate
world that true independence is often lacking, and that good faith is
easily feigned. The prospect of judicial review helps stiffen the
backbone of the independent director. 13 3 For that reason, we believe
that the Delaware courts should try to keep the courthouse doors open
to public company derivative lawsuits challenging duty of loyalty
transactions, so long as this does not result in significant increases in
litigation agency costs.
For duty of care cases, federal regulation has moved
increasingly to specifying what officers must do in managing the
corporation and providing a forum for litigation when governance has
133. See generally James D. Cox, The ALI, Institutionalization,and Disclosure: The Quest for
the Outside Director's Spine, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1233, 1273 (1993) (finding that outside
directors serve the purpose of discouraging managerial overreaching due to increasingly
stringent disclosure principles placed upon them).
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broken down. 134 This litigation in turn is heard by federal district
courts across the country. Federal district judges seldom return to a
given topic about which he or she may have gained some expertise,
and the federal appellate bench is so numerous and diverse that it,
too, lacks continuity. The Supreme Court is noted for its absence from
making any significant law in the area, having decided only four
minor securities law cases in the last eight terms, and having not
135
heard a corporate law case in recent memory.
Thus, the hard question in duty of care cases is whether
Delaware should be concerned about such a shift in the range of
corporate governance issues resolved in Delaware and those that go to
federal court. Delaware has at least three significant advantages over
the federal courts as a forum for resolving these cases: (1) Delaware
has more experienced trial court judges; (2) these judges work to
create a unified body of case law; and (3) the Delaware courts resolve
civil cases much more quickly than their federal counterparts. Yet we
must acknowledge that public company derivative litigation of duty of
care cases is not producing significant monetary benefits for
shareholders at present. 136 Undoubtedly, plaintiffs' counsel are aware
of the impact of 102(b)(7) on their chances of gaining a monetary
recovery in these cases 137 and are filing these suits in federal court as
securities class actions alleging disclosure violations. If the Delaware
courts are to attract these cases, they need to address earlier
precedents as to the extent that the 102(b)(7) statutory exculpation
provisions can be applied in disclosure cases. Delaware might be
reluctant to take this action if it believed that it might render other
states more attractive as incorporation forums.
In short, the desirability of making duty of care cases easier to
bring is more tenuous than for duty of loyalty cases. If litigation
agency costs can be kept low, and if the corporate governance benefits
from duty of care suits are sufficiently large, it would benefit
Delaware to encourage these suits to move to Delaware so that its
judiciary could resolve these corporate governance issues.

134. Thompson & Sale, supra note 3, at 897, 910.
135. E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: The
DisappearingPlaceof Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571 (2004).
136. However, derivative suits alleging violations of the duty of care also can lead to
corporate governance changes that have beneficial effects for shareholders.
137. For example, in the second round of the Disney litigation over executive compensation,
the plaintiffs chose to cast their complaint as one for breach of the duty of good faith, rather than
the duty of care, almost certainly because Disney's charter contained a 102(b)(7) provision in it.
See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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2. Policy Proposals
How should we change the law to encourage public company
derivative suits? 138
As we discussed earlier, the relatively high
procedural barriers to successfully litigating derivative suits have
resulted in their exhibiting much lower levels of the indicia of
litigation agency costs than either state court class actions or federal
securities fraud class actions. Removing all of these barriers in all
derivative actions might result in a sharp shift away from its
competitors-the state and federal class action-into the now
procedurally-easier derivative suit. In other words, we must be
sensitive to the degree of substitutability of these different forms of
representative litigation and not cause a sudden shift in favor of
derivative suits, or we could create high litigation agency costs for
derivative actions.
However, if we limit the reduction of these barriers to suits
that are filed by larger institutional shareholders, we predict this will
not have such an effect. Our reasons for this statement are as follows.
First, it bears remembering that the census of shareholders and the
effectiveness of markets have changed dramatically from the time
when derivative suits were seen as the principal regulator of
corporative governance to when the current procedural limitations
were put in place. Institutional shareholders now own the majority of
shares in most large American public corporations. Many of the
recent corporate governance proposals have been aimed at enhancing
the role of the institutional shareholders-to permit them to use their
voting or selling power so as to check abuses by the board. The recent
proposals by the SEC on shareholder access to the nomination process
would add a complex set of regulations that, if they are to work at all,
require the active participation of institutional investors. 139 All of
these forces push institutional investors to become active in corporate
governance.
Yet institutional investors have shown themselves unwilling to
become too closely intertwined with their portfolio companies. 140 They
show little inclination to become directors or to offer names of those
who are willing to serve. They have pushed for greater powers to
138. It is possible that the dearth of derivative suits has little to do with legal obstacles, but
rather stems from a lack of financial incentives. If derivative suits primarily benefit corporations
by policing petty theft or minor frauds, then perhaps plaintiffs simply do not see any point in
filing them, preferring instead to let corporate boards deal with such matters.
139. See supra note 19.
140. See generally, Michael Klausner, InstitutionalShareholders, Private Equity, and Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 755 (2003) (institutions have different
objectives with their voting and investment decisions).
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accept a tender offer, so that they support poison pill redemption and
board declassification proposals, but they have not sought to bring
about additional corporate governance changes through their voting or
selling power.
The PSLRA tried to get institutional shareholders to use their
shareholder's right to sue to become lead plaintiffs in securities fraud
class actions. The hope was that they would increase the size of
recoveries while simultaneously reducing the litigation agency costs
Bringing a suit does not require
associated with those suits.
institutions to take on the role of director or insider that causes
problems for the institutions. As a result, institutional shareholders
have become more involved in federal securities law claims, and some
law firms have developed a repeat relationship with institutional
shareholders. However, the federal experience with the PSLRA's lead
plaintiff provision indicates that institutional plaintiffs have not
become overactive litigants, 4 ' making it unlikely that opening up
derivative litigation to these plaintiffs would result in an avalanche of
142
new suits.
In light of these facts, we propose that Delaware and other
states modify the demand requirement for derivative litigation so that
demand is excused for a 1 percent shareholder. 143 At the large
companies that are the focus of most public company derivative
litigation, most such shareholders are likely to be institutions. One
percent owners hold substantial financial interests in these companies
and are unlikely to act against their own self-interest by inflicting
injuries on the firms they own. 144 This is the intuition behind the
recent SEC proposal for shareholder access to proxy, a federal
intrusion into the heart of state corporate law. 45 Moreover, if
141. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Reassessing the Lead Plaintiff Provision: Is the
Experiment Paying Off (Working Paper, Mar. 20, 2003) (on file with authors).
142. The harder question, is if we remove the procedural barriers, will institutional investors
pursue corporate wrongdoing using derivative suits? If derivative cases involve petty theft, or
minor frauds, then it is quite possible that the economic incentives to go after them will be
insufficient. Indeed, even in the securities fraud arena, where some of the frauds have been
spectacular, institutional investors have been slow to file suits.
143. The most expeditious method for enacting such a change would be a legislative
amendment to Section 327 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.
144. Another alternative would be to permit long-term holders to file suit without satisfying
the demand requirement. The idea here would be that such shareholders have a stronger
interest in the firm and are more likely to have been monitoring it over a longer period of time.
A third option would be to trade-off the two requirements. For example, the initial threshold for
the exemption might be designed for a 1 percent shareholder. However, as the period of time a
shareholder held the stock increased, the amount of stock they would be required to hold would
decline. We thank Professor Steve Choi for suggesting this point.
145. See Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be
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Delaware adopted a 1 percent shareholder exemption from the
demand requirement, this would still leave it with much greater
procedural protections against abusive suits than exist in most state
and federal securities class actions, in which only a relatively small
146
number of lead plaintiffs hold that much stock.
The more difficult question is whether Delaware should go
further and remove some of the other obstacles to public company
derivative litigation. For example, the possibility that a corporation
will appoint a special litigation committee to investigate the claims
made in cases brought by 1 percent shareholders could have a chilling
effect on the likelihood that institutions would file such cases. In duty
of loyalty cases, this takes us back to the hard question of whether
independent directors are better monitors of conflict of interest
transactions than courts. While this is a difficult call to make, we
think courts can review duty of loyalty situations effectively because
the presence or absence of a conflict is readily verifiable and because
methods of obtaining disinterested director or shareholder approval
are easily accessed. Furthermore, when an entire fairness analysis is
required, a court is a more disinterested decision-maker than even an
independent director. On the other side of the equation, special
litigation committees have often been used to stop judicial inquiry into
the facts surrounding conflict of interest transactions. 147 While
arguably worthwhile as a method of stopping frivolous litigation in a
world of high litigation agency costs, the justification for using them
disappears when institutional investors are the plaintiffs representing
the company.
In duty of care cases, it is less clear that courts have an
advantage over the independent directors of a special litigation
committee. On the one hand, courts can verify the types of procedures
used and whether they were sufficient to provide the board with all
material information reasonably available to them concerning the
transaction at issue. On the other hand, directors have a better

codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/3448626.htm.
146. Cox & Thomas, supra note 141 (finding that in a sample of federal securities fraud class
actions, the median individual lead plaintiff held only 0.09% of the company's stock).
147. The limited data that has been collected on this question supports the view that the
appointment of a special litigation committee almost always leads to dismissal of the case. Cox,
supra note 6, at 963 (as of 1982 reporting that "there have been more than a score of special
litigation committees to date, in all but one the committee concluded that the suit in question
was not in the corporation's best interests."). Professor Cox also reports that as of 1988, there
were forty-four reported SLC cases with only one case where the special committee recommended
pursuing some of the claims brought to their attention. Correspondence between authors and
Professor James D. Cox (May 5, 2004) (on file with authors).
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understanding of the board's knowledge as of the time of the
transaction, and their analysis will be reviewed by the court.
One interesting aspect of the duty of care cases is that special
litigation committees do not appear to be used in federal securities
litigation over disclosures concerning duty of care violations. This
suggests that at least the federal courts have decided that these
groups do not provide an adequate substitute for judicial review of
duty of care violations.
We think that this issue merits further consideration after
adoption of the 1 percent shareholder exemption for the demand
requirement. If companies respond with widespread use of special
litigation committees, then we would argue in favor of eliminating any
judicial deference to special litigation committee reports for cases
brought by these plaintiffs, at least in the duty of loyalty setting.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper analyzes all derivative suits filed in the Delaware
Chancery Court during 1999 and 2000. We find that relatively few
derivative actions are brought, about forty per year, with two-thirds of
them naming public company defendants and the remaining one-third
against private companies.
For public company derivative litigation, we hypothesize that
these suits have been strangled by procedural hurdles, such as the
demand requirement and other constraints that make ultimate
recovery unlikely, including special litigation committees and
Delaware's statutory limitation on monetary recovery for duty of care
claims. For those suits that are filed, however, we find that the
associated litigation agency costs are low in comparison to other forms
of representative litigation and that there are significant benefits. For
that reason, we argue that Delaware and other states should consider
creating exceptions to the existing procedural and substantive barriers
to these suits for institutional investors holding more than 1 percent
of the company's stock.
These exemptions should not increase
litigation agency costs and may significantly benefit other
shareholders.
For closely held firms, the small number of derivative lawsuits
presents something of a puzzle. Given the absence of other types of
remedies for minority investors in Delaware's legal scheme, derivative
lawsuits should comprise an important piece of Delaware's system of
regulating close corporate management. However, both the small
number of these cases, and the relatively small number of cases
resulting in a recovery for the plaintiff, support the claim that private
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company derivative litigation is not carrying much weight. We can
only speculate whether that is because Delaware's emphasis on
private ordering remedies is more efficient in resolving disputes than
the court system, or because there is another type of legal remedy,
such as the direct suit, being used by minority investors in Delaware
companies.

